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KEFFELER V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH
SERVICES: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF
WASHINGTON MISTOOK CARING FOR CHILDREN AS
ROBBING THEM BLIND
Tobias J. Kammer
Abstract: Social Security benefits aid in the basic care of beneficiaries. Washington's
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) used benefits toward this end until Keffeler
v. Deptartmentof Social and Health Services. In Keffeler, the Supreme Court of Washington
ruled that DSHS, even when acting as representative payee, could not use a foster child's
Social Security benefits to pay for his or her current maintenance. The court held that DSHS's
use of Social Security benefits to pay for the current maintenance of foster children violated
42 U.S.C. § 407 of the Social Security Act, which protects Social Security beneficiaries from
the claims of creditors. The Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that because state law
required DSHS to provide foster care, it could not reimburse itself for the costs of that care
without becoming a creditor, in violation of § 407(a). Section 405G) of the Social Security
Act states that benefits must be used in the best interests of the beneficiary. The court stated
that because DSHS was already required to provide for the current maintenance of foster
children, using Social Security benefits for maintenance was not in the children's best
interests. This Note argues that federal law and Social Security regulations permit DSHSwhen acting as representative payee-to use Social Security benefits for the current
maintenance costs of foster children. States may act as representative payees, and use benefits
to pay for the current maintenance of beneficiaries under 42 U.S.C § 4050), which
pronounces that such a use is considered to be in the best interests of a beneficiary.

Social Security-usually associated with old age and retirementprovides a vital resource not only for the elderly but also for children.!
Indeed, approximately 3.8 million children collect benefits.2 However,
many children in Washington State will never receive the Social Security
benefits to which they are entitled The children eligible for these
benefits have usually suffered the loss of a parent, have a disabled parent,
or are disabled themselves.4 These benefits are meant to aid with the
1. SOCIAL SECURrY ADMINISTRATION, SSA PUBLICATION NO. 05-10085, BENEIT S FOR
CHILDREN (2001).
2. Id.
3. The Supreme Court of Washington recognized this in Keffeler v. Department of Social and
Health Services, 145 Wash. 2d 1, 32 P.3d 267 (2001). In Keffeler, the court acknowledged that
Washington's Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) would not apply to become
representative payee for foster children if not allowed to use Social Security benefits for the child's
current maintenance. Id. at 14, 32 P.3d at 274. Unless the state forced DSHS to apply for Social
Security benefits, as in the best interest of foster children, many children will be left entirely without
benefits.
4. See supranote 1.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 77:877, 2002

shortfall such losses create-to pay for food, clothing, shelter and, funds
permitting, perhaps a computer or music lessons.5 Yet for some children
those funds will never appear and instead will sit idle in the federal
treasury.
This loss is the result of Keffeler v. Department of Social and Health
Services.6 In Keffeler, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the
state's Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) could not use
Social Security benefits to pay for a foster child's current maintenance
costs, even when the Social Security Administration (SSA) had
appointed DSHS to act as the representative payee for the child.7 Keffeler
is especially harsh to the truly abandoned child, effectively favoring
children who have someone to act on their behalf over those who have
no one other than the state.8 As the court was fully aware, DSHS will not
apply to act as representative payee if not permitted to use benefits for
the child's current maintenance due to the application expenses.9 Thus,
those children who rely completely on DSHS will necessarily be left
without their benefits.
Under certain circumstances-such as those in Keffeler-SSA may
assign state agencies the responsibility of acting as representative
payee.' 0 An agency, such as DSHS, must first apply to SSA to act as
representative payee for each beneficiary it wishes to serve." In deciding
whether to accept the application to act as payee, SSA considers
numerous factors" and will only appoint the person or agency that it
determines will act in the best interest of the beneficiary.' 3 The Social
Security Act generally forbids creditors from acting as representative
5. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(a)(1) (2001).
6. 145 Wash. 2d 1, 32 P.3d 267 (2001).
7. Id. at 25, 32 P.3d at 279.
8. This is the case because children who rely exclusively on the state for such representation will,
after Keffeler, have no one to petition SSA on their behalf to receive their Social Security benefits.
See infra Part IV. While there is a remote possibility a relative or someone else may step forward to
seek benefits on behalf of these children, the reality is that many of these children are entirely
dependent on the state. See infra Part W.
9. See Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 15, 32 P.3d at 274.
10. See 42 U.S.C § 405(j) (1994).
11. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2025 (2001). DSHS is authorized by the Washington State Legislature to act
as representative payee for foster children. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.060 (2001).
12. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2025.
13. Id § 404.2020.

Keffeler v. Departmentof Social and Health Services

payees,' 4 though the Commissioner may appoint a creditor where he or
she determines it would be in the best interests of the beneficiary."5 SSA
recognizes that a payee who uses benefits to pay for a child's current
maintenance costs acts in the child's best interests. 6 In Keffeler, SSA
appointed DSHS to serve as representative payee for certain foster
children. 7 DSHS in turn used those benefits to pay for the current
maintenance of the beneficiaries in state care, 18 as explicitly permitted by
the Social Security Act.' Nonetheless, while all other representative
payees may still use Social Security benefits to pay for a beneficiary's
current maintenance," the Supreme Court of Washington, singled out the
state and said that it could not act as representative payee.2'
This Note argues that the Keffeler court erred in its interpretation of
the Social Security Act's representative payee program, which permits a
representative payee to apply a beneficiary's Social Security earnings
toward that person's current maintenance. Part I of this Note examines
DSHS and the methods it uses to realize its mission. Part II explores the
purpose of the Social Security Act, focusing on the provisions relevant to
Keffeler. Part III describes the deference that courts must give to agency
decisions. Part IV outlines the facts, procedural history, holding, and
rationale of the Keffeler decision. Finally, Part V argues that the Supreme
Court of Washington erred in holding that a representative payee cannot
use Social Security earnings to pay for the current maintenance of foster
children. Federal laws and regulations permit representative payees,
including DSHS, to use benefits to pay for a beneficiary's current
maintenance costs, which is exactly what DSHS did and should be
allowed to do.

14. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1994).
15. Id. § 405(j)(2)(C)(ii).
16. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2035, 404.2040 (2001).
17. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 3-8, 32 P.3d at 268-69. The one class member for whom DSHS did
not serve as representative payee was Daniel Keffeler, the class representative. Id. at 14, 32 P.3d at
273. DSHS never collected any of Keffeler's Social Security benefits. Id.
18. DSHS also used benefits to pay for the past maintenance of beneficiaries. Keffeler, 145 Wash.
2d at 11-12, 32 P.3d at 272. This Note does not take issue with the court's holding that benefits may
not be used for past maintenance, as per 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).

19. Id. § 405(j).
20. See Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 25-26, 32 P.3d at 279 (applying only to state agencies' use of
benefits).
21. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 16, 32 P.3d at 274.
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WASHINGTON'S DSHS EXISTS IN PART TO ENSURE THE
WELL-BEING OF TE STATE'S CHILDREN

DSHS is an umbrella organization responsible for the integration of
statewide social service programs that form a safeguard for those who
are unable to effectively care for themselves.22 Through seven separate
administrations,' DSHS administers a large family of programs designed
to aid those in need.24 Of interest for this Note is the Children's
Administration (CA), which runs the foster care program.' The state,
taxpayers, and parents all share the burden of paying for the foster care
program operated by CA.2
CA is the collection of programs within DSHS charged with providing
child welfare, child protective services, childcare licensing, and foster
care. CA's foster care program serves children in need of protection
from abuse, neglect, or other serious family problems.28 While children
are in foster care, the state pays for their upkeep, as required by state
law.2 9 As of September 1999, the state had over 10,000 foster children
under its supervision. CA takes care of these children by finding them
families that can meet their needs. 1 Only families that CA determines
22. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-01-020 (2001); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 43.20A.010 (2001),
(stating that "[t]he department of social and health services is designed to integrate and coordinate
all those activities involving provision of care for individuals who, as a result of their economic,
social or health condition, require financial assistance, institutional care, rehabilitation or other social
and health services.").
23. The programs are the following: the Aging and Adult Services Administration; the Children's
Administration; the Economic Services Administration; the Health and Rehabilitative Services
Administration; the Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration; the Management Services
Administration; and the Medical Assistance Administration. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-01020; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.20A.010 (2001).
24. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-01-020; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.20A.010.
25. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0010 (2001).
26. See In re Feldman's Welfare, 94 Wash. 2d 244, 250-51, 615 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1980); WASH.
REv. CODE § 74.13.031 (2001), WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0215 (2001).
27. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0010 (2001). WASH. REV. CODE. § 74.13.031 1-10 (2001)
authorizes the CA to make available foster care services. Id.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031 (2001).
29. Id. This provides that "[t]he department shall have the duty to provide child welfare services
and shall: (1) Develop, administer, supervise, and monitor a coordinated and comprehensive plan
that establishes, aids, and strengthens services for the protection and care of runaway, dependent, or
neglected children." Id.
30. Keffeler v. Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 145 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 32 P.3d 267, 269 (2001).
31. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0090 (2001).
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will meet a child's needs may provide foster care. 2 While foster families
are responsible for meeting a child's basic needs, such as cooking dinner
3 they are not financially liable for the
or taking an ill child to a doctor,
34
maintenance.
current
child's
The State of Washington is financially responsible for the current
maintenance of foster children3 5 The state meets this fiduciary obligation
by paying foster families for the child's current maintenance, 36 and in
turn the foster families provide for the child's day-to-day upkeep. 37 The
state also pays for any additional special needs the child might have
when the payment schedule does not provide enough to meet that need.35
The state is not alone in its duties toward these children. Parents must
reimburse the state for foster care services 9 in the amount determined by
DSHS's Division of Child Support, thereby decreasing the overall
burden to taxpayers and holding parents accountable for their parental
duties.4" Additionally, CA must use a child's unearned income-such as
Social Security benefits and inheritances, for that child's current
maintenance costs-except where the terms of receipt of the income
specifically exclude such use.!4 ' Such unearned income must be sent to
DSHS's Division of Child Support if the child is in foster care,

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Washington state, under WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031 (2001), and parents, under WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0215 (2001), are financially responsible for a foster child's maintenance.
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031.
36. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0120 (2001). This regulation provides that the state will
provide for a foster child's room, board, clothes, and other personal needs. Id. It determines the
amount by looking at a number of factors, including the child's age. Id. For example, a foster family
caring for a four-year-old foster child would typically receive $351.31 per month, while a foster
family caring for a 13-year-old would receive $499.95 per month. Id.
37. WAsH. REV. CODE § 74.13.330 (2001).
38. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0125 (2001); see also id. § 388-25-0160.
39. Id. § 388-25-0215; see also In re Feldman's Welfare, 94 Wash. 2d 244, 250, 615 P.2d 1290,
1294 (1980).
40. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0220 (2001); see also Cole v. State, 54 Wash. App. 342, 346,
773 P.2d 866, 868 (1989), (requiring parents to pay for their children helped "advance the law's
purpose of recovering state child support expenditures to the extent possible." (quoting State v.
Gerlack, 25 Wash. App. 541,547,612 P.2d 382,385 (1980)).
41. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-25-0210 (2001).
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regardless of who receives it on the child's behalf.4" Again, this is meant
to lessen the burden on the taxpayer.43
In summary, taxpayers support foster children through means other
than DSHS and state taxes. Social Security income is one example of
this. As stated above, many children are eligible for Social Security
benefits. Prior to the Keffeler decision, DSHS was in a position to help
those children receive those benefits, which it would then apply toward
the costs of their care. After Keffeler, DSHS will not expend state
resources to reach those benefits since they may no longer be used by the
state to care for the child and thus pursuing these benefits would act as an
overall drain on the foster care program.
II.

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS GUARANTEE ELIGIBLE
CHILDREN A MINIMAL LEVEL OF INCOME AND ARE
HEAVILY GUARDED AGAINST CREDITORS

Social Security is often associated with retirement benefits and is
familiar to most people as paycheck deductions. Yet Social Security has
many applications apart from retirement. 44 Notably, children are eligible
for benefits under limited circumstances, such as where they have
suffered the loss of a parent, have a disabled parent, or are disabled
themselves.4 The function of these benefits is to offer a minimum level
of income and provide stability to children who have lost someone upon
whom they depended,46 or to help them overcome obstacles put in place
by their disability.47 SSA estimates that it provides benefits to
approximately 3.8 million children in an effort to address these
concerns. 48 The cost of providing these benefits to children totals
approximately $1.6 billion dollars every month. 49 In light of this, SSA
42. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE. § 74.20A.010 (2001) ("It is declared to be the public policy of
this state that this chapter be construed and administered to the end that children shall be maintained
from the resources of responsible parents, thereby relieving, at least in part, the burden presently
borne by the general citizenry through welfare programs.").
43. Cole, 54 Wash. App. at 346,773 P.3d at 868.
44. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PUBLICATION No. 05-10085 (March 2001).
45. Id.

46. Mellies v. Mellies, 815 P.2d 114, 116 (Kan. 1991).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1988).
48. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PUBLICATION NO. 05-10085 (March 2001).

49. Id.
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takes great effort to guard these benefits against undue appropriation, and
shields benefits from creditors.50
A.

RepresentativePayeesHelp Children Manage Their Benefits to
Meet Their Basic Needs

Given the large sums at stake, SSA seeks to administer children's
benefits efficiently and to that end regularly assigns representative
payees where the beneficiary is less than 18 years old.5 1 A representative
payee is an individual or organization that receives benefits on behalf of
the beneficiary, either because that person is incapable of managing his
or her own benefits or because such an arrangement is in the person's
best interest.5 2 A representative payee can be a person, organization,
agency, or institution.53 SSA appoints representative payees to safeguard
the beneficiary from exploitation and misuse of benefits. 4 SSA therefore
seeks to appoint the person or agency that will, in its view, best serve the
beneficiary's interests 5 Representative payees who fail to fulfill their
duties may face removal from the position. 6
1.

The SSA has BroadDiscretion to Appoint RepresentativePayees
Who Act in the Best Interest of the Beneficiary

The Commissioner of SSA has broad discretion to appoint
representative payees. 57 The central issue is the Commissioner's
determination that a particular representative payee will act in the best
interest of the beneficiary. 8 The Commissioner determines who will act
in the beneficiary's best interest based on a number of factors, and

50. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
51. Id. § 405 (j)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2001(b), 416.601(b) (2001).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.2001(b), 416.601(b).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A).
54. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035 (2001).

55. Id. § 404.2020.
56. Id. § 416.650.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A) (1994). Lower level SSA employees, not the Commissioner, make
the actual determination.

58. See id. § 405G).
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appoints whichever person or organization is determined to best serve
those interests.5 9
Before appointing a representative payee, the agency will first
examine whether the beneficiary actually needs a representative payee.'
SSA's policy is that wherever feasible, each beneficiary will receive and
manage his or her own benefits. 1 To determine whether a beneficiary
needs a representative payee, SSA looks to information contained in
court documents and medical records, and considers statements made by
relatives, friends, or others in a position to know and understand the
beneficiary's capabilities as t8 whether she or he needs assistance in
managing benefits.6 If SSA determines it is in the beneficiary's best
interests to have a representative payee, SSA will provide notice of its
decision to the beneficiary and provide time to appeal.6 Once SSA
concludes that the beneficiary needs a representative payee, the focus
shifts to choosing the best one."
In deciding whether a potential payee would best serve the interests of
the beneficiary, SSA considers many issues. These include: the
relationship between potential payee and the beneficiary; 6 the extent of
interest the potential payee has shown in the beneficiary;6 6 any legal
authority the potential payee has to act for the beneficiary; 67 whether the

59. For example, 20 C.F.R. § 404.2020 (2001) provides:
In selecting a payee we try to select the person, agency, organization or institution that will best
serve the interest of the beneficiary. In making our selection we consider (a)

The relationship of the person to the beneficiary;

(b)
(c)

The amount of interest that the person shows in the beneficiary;
Any legal authority the person, agency, organization or institution has to act on behalf of
the beneficiary;
(d) Whether the potential payee has custody of the beneficiary; and
(e) Whether the potential payee is in a position to know of and look after the needs of the
beneficiary
.
20
C.F.R.
§ 416.615 (2001).
60
.
Id.
§
416.601.
61
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(j)(2)(E)(ii), 1383(a)(2)(B)(xii) (1994); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2030 (2001).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 4050).
65. 20 C.F.R. § 416.620(a) (2001).
66. Id. § 416.620(b).
67. Id. § 416.620(c).
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applicant has custody of the beneficiary;68 and whether the applicant is in
a situation "to know of and look after the needs of" the beneficiary.69
SSA will evaluate these factors and appoint as representative payee the
applicant who best satisfies these criteria.7'
The agency prefers to appoint parents or other family relations to the
representative payee position where possible.7' Yet SSA's primary
concern is to choose the best possible representative payee; thus, if SSA
determines that a state agency will be a better representative payee than a
parent, SSA will appoint the state agency.7 2 The emphasis on choosing a
representative payee who best serves the beneficiary's interest is so great
that the Commissioner may appoint individuals or organizations even
when the statute specifically prohibits them from becoming
representative payees.73 For example, the statute ordinarily precludes
someone convicted of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(b)-a felony
offense involving misuse of Social Security benefits-from becoming a
representative payee. 74 However, the Commissioner may appoint that
person or agency to act as payee if it is in the best interest of the
beneficiary to do so.7 5 Even a beneficiary's creditor,76 who the statute
normally precludes from serving as a representative payee, may act as a
representative payee where the Commissioner determines that such an
appointment would be in the best interest of the beneficiary.77
2.

RepresentativePayees Must Act in the Best Interest of the
Beneficiary and Follow SSA Guidelines or Face Removalfrom the
Payee Position

The Commissioner of SSA will appoint whomever he or she
determines will act in the best interest of the beneficiary, the person who
68. Id. § 416.620(d).
69. Id. § 416.620(e).
70. 20 C.F.R. § 416.625 (2001).
71. Id. § 416.621 (2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iv)(11) (1994).
72. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.621 (2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iv)(III).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 4050j)(2)(C)(ii).

74. Id. § 408(b).
75. Id. § 405j)(2)(C)(ii).
76. A creditor is defined in iaL § 405(j)(2)(C)(i)(1i) as an individual who provides the beneficiary
"vith goods and services for consideration."

77. Id. § 405(j)(2)(C)(iii)(II).
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will best accomplish the duties of a representative payee."
Representative payees owe, to the beneficiaries they serve, a duty to use
the benefits received in a manner they determine to be in the
beneficiaries' best interests. 79 The statute requires them to inform SSA of
events that could affect the right of the beneficiary to receive benefits.80
They must, upon request, submit a written report accounting for the
benefits received 8' and they must inform SSA of anything that would
affect their performance of payee duties.82
SSA considers payments made for the current maintenance of the
beneficiary to be in the best interests of the beneficiary. 3 Beneficiaries
have challenged this conclusion, notably in Mellies v. Mellies84 and In re
Guardianship of Nelson.85 In Mellies, a Kansas case, the beneficiary
claimed that because his representative payee was already required to
provide for his current maintenance,86 that his payee should conserve his
benefits for other uses rather than spend them on maintenance costs the
payee was already legally obligated to provide. 87 The beneficiary argued
that any benefits spent toward current maintenance amounted to actions
by the representative payee not in his best interests, in violation of SSA
regulations and federal law. 88 This rationale did not persuade the Kansas
Supreme Court.89 Specifically, the Mellies court wrote that a
representative payee had "no obligation to exhaust his personal finances

78. Id. § 405(j)(1)(A).
79. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035 (2001).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. In an effort to continually track whether the representative payee is fulfilling his or her
duties, SSA may also require that payee to continue to provide certain information after the initial
appointment. Id.§ 404.2035 (2001). Failure to provide such information may result in removal of
that payee. Id. The SSA will provide notice and time to appeal to a beneficiary's current
representative payee if it selects another payee. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405()(2)(E)(ii), 1383(a)(2)(B)(xii); 20
C.F.R. § 404.2030 (2001).
83. 20 C.F.R. § 416.640 (2001).
84. 815 P.2d 114 (Kan. 1991).
85. 547 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
86. The representative payee in Mellies was also the beneficiary's father and thus required to pay
for his child's current maintenance regardless of Social Security benefits. Mellies, 815 P.2d at 115.
87. ld. at 116.
88. Id.
89. See id.
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in providing for [the beneficiary's] support before spending any of [the
child's] Social Security benefits on... maintenance.""0
The plaintiff in Nelson, in a Minnesota court, made essentially the
same argument." In this case it was the representative payee who went to
court and asked to be allowed to use the Social Security benefits he
received on the beneficiary's behalf for that beneficiary's current
maintenance.92 As was the case in Mellies, this representative payee was
already legally required to provide for the current maintenance of the
beneficiary.93 The lower court had held that the representative payee
could not use the beneficiary's Social Security benefits for current
maintenance because he was already required to provide for that
maintenance.94 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed.95 The court
held that representative payees were not only allowed to use benefits for
the beneficiary's current maintenance, but that they were also requiredto
do so-a state court ruling demanding anything to the contrary violated
federal law.96
SSA may replace representative payees who fail to act in the
beneficiary's best interests.97 A payee fails to act in the beneficiary's best
interests where he or she does not use the benefits according to SSA
guidelines or falls short of the responsibilities described above.9" Failure
to cooperate with SSA will also result in removal from the representative
payee position.99 Moreover, misuse of benefits by a representative payee
is a felony.0 Misuse includes "knowingly and willfully convert[ing] ...
payment, or any part thereof, to a use other than for the use and benefit
of [the beneficiary]."1°1
90. Id. at 117. However, where Social Security benefits exceed the beneficiary's current
maintenance and other needs, the representative payee then has the duty to conserve or invest the

funds for the beneficiary. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.645 (2001).
91. See Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 106.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 107.
94. Id. at 106-07.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 109.
97. 20 C.F.R. § 416.650 (2001).

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(5) (1994).
101. ld.

Washington Law Review

B.

Vol. 77:877, 2002

Social Security Benefits are not Subject to CreditorClaims, Even
Where the Creditoris a State that Providesfor the Basic
Maintenance of Beneficiaries

Social Security benefits are meant to provide for a beneficiary's basic
needs, not to pay debt owed to creditors."' 2 While the law requires
representative payees to use benefits for the best interest of the
beneficiary, creditors have no such obligation whatsoever. 10 3 To the
contrary, creditors by definition simply seek to reimburse themselves for
goods and services rendered." 4 Section 407(a) protects beneficiaries
from creditors by preventing them from reaching Social Security
benefits.'05 The "other legal process" provision of § 407(a) is a sweeping
provision meant to prevent creditors from using creative ways to illegally
reach benefits." 6 The sections that follow describe these creative
attempts in detail. This statute protects beneficiaries by creating an
expansive bar against creditor claims, even where the creditor is a
state.0 7 Indeed, some creditors may be institutions that provide for a
beneficiary's basic needs, such as a state mental institution or a prison.0 8
While this kind of institution provides for a beneficiary's current
maintenance, thus fulfilling a primary concern of Social Security, it is
nonetheless still a creditor and § 407 prevents it from reaching
benefits. 0 9 The "[c]ourts have uniformly recognized that the purpose of
§ 407(a) is to protect Social Security beneficiaries... from the claims of
102. Id. § 4050).
103. The statute defines creditor in 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(2)(C)(i)(III) as an individual who provides
the beneficiary "with goods and services for consideration." The statute imposes no duties on
creditors.
104. See supra note 76.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 407 provides "(a) the right of any person to any future payment under this title
[42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.] shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the
moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this title shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency
law."

106. See Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973); Bennett v. Arkansas,
485 U.S. 395, 396 (1988).
107. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 417; Bennett, 485 U.S. at 396.
108. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 414; Bennett, 485 U.S. at 397; Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162,
1168 (9th Cir. 1995); Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263, 264 (9th Cir. 1989).
109. Pursuant to § 407, a beneficiary may not assign or transfer his or her right to receive benefits,
and those benefits are unavailable to creditors. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1994). This section applies to
Title II benefits. Title XVI benefits are equally protected. Id.
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creditors.. 1 . Nonetheless, creditors have persistently tried and failed to
skirt this provision.'
1.

Case Law Supports § 407's BroadBarAgainst CreditorClaims,
Even Where The CreditorProvidesfor the Basic Needs of the
Beneficiary

Creditors appear in many forms and provide numerous services. At
times they attempt to veil themselves in the cloak of permissible expense,
such as by claiming they are accomplishing the goals of Social Security
by caring for beneficiaries and thus should receive the benefits."'
Creditors have claimed that because they fulfill the same needs that a
representative payee would, they may also receive benefits." 3 However,
the difference between a creditor and a representative payee is striking
and has made a critical difference in determining whether a state may
collect Social Security benefits." 4 Section 407 creates a broad bar against
creditor claims, and the fact that a creditor is a state institution and
provides for the current maintenance of a beneficiary does not mean that
the creditor may therefore seize Social Security benefits." 5 Numerous
courts have applied § 407 as a broad bar against the claims of creditors,
as seen in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board,"6 Bennett v.
Arkansas,"7 Brinkman v. Rahm," 8 and Crawford v. Gould."9 Each of

110. Fetterusso v. State of New York, 898 F.2d 322,327 (2dCir. 1990).
111. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 416; Bennett, 485 U.S. at 396; Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264;
Crawford,56 F.3d at 1166.
112. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 416; Bennett, 485 U.S. at 396; Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264;
Crawford,56 F.3d at 1166.
113. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 416; Bennett, 485 U.S. at 396; Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264;
Crawford,56 F.3d at 1166.
114. Creditors have no legal duty to use Social Security benefits for the best interests of the
beneficiary. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), 405(0) (1994). Representative payees, on the other hand, are
required to act in the best interests of the beneficiary. Id. § 4050). Moreover, misuse of Social
Security benefits by a representative payee is a felony, under 42 U.S.C. § 408(1994).
115. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 416; Bennett, 485 U.S. at 396; Brinkman, 878 F.2d at 264;
Crawford,56 F.3d at 1166.
116. 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
117. 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
118. 878 F.2d263 (9th Cir. 1989).
119. 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995).
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these cases supports the rule that creditors may not reach Social Security
benefits.
In Philpott, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a state may not reach
Social Security benefits by virtue of providing a beneficiary with welfare
services.' ° This was the case even though the beneficiary signed an
agreement to remit to the state all welfare benefits, including any Social
Security he might receive. 21 When the beneficiary in Philpottdid receive
Social Security benefits, in the amount of $1,864.20," the Essex County
Welfare Board decided to enforce the agreement to pay back welfare
benefits."2 New Jersey argued on behalf of the Welfare Board. 12 The
state claimed the beneficiary ought to at least pay back the state the
amount of money by which his welfare benefits would have been
reduced had he been receiving Social Security benefits when he first
applied for welfare."z The welfare board knew of § 407 and argued that,
despite being a creditor, an implied exemption existed to its attachment
of benefits, at least with regard to the amount it could have withheld if
the beneficiary had been receiving Social Security benefits when he
applied for welfare. 26 The Court found no merit in New Jersey's
argument, stating "[w]e see no reason why a State, performing its
statutory duty to take care of the needy, should be in a preferred position
as compared with any other creditor."' 27
In Bennett, the Supreme Court again made clear that a creditor could
not reach benefits. 28 The Court found this to be the case even where the
creditor completely provided for the beneficiary's current
maintenance.'29 In Bennett, the Arkansas state legislature sought to attach
the Social Security benefits of prison inmates. 3 ' The state argued that
this situation differed from that in Philpott because where the Essex

120. Philpott,409 U.S. at 416.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 415.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 414.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 416.
127. Id.
128. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 397 (1988).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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County Welfare Board paid for only a percentage of the beneficiary's
upkeep, a state necessarily had to pay for all of a prisoner's upkeep.' 3' In
a per curiam decision, the Court reiterated that § 407(a) "unambiguously
rules out any attempt to attach Social Security benefits.' 3 2
However, even after Philpott and Bennett, creditors, including states,
still sought to circumvent § 407. In Brinkman, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Washington State violated § 407 when it tried to attach
Social Security benefits of mental patients "for whom the state [was] not
the representative payee."' 3 Washington's policy was to seize benefits in
order to pay for a patient's basic care and maintenance.'34 The state
provided notice to the patients of its intent to seize their benefits from
accounts with the state hospitals, and allowed time for appeal. 35 If the
patient lost or failed to appeal, the state collected Social Security benefits
via attachment, seizure, or garnishment.' 3 The Ninth Circuit held that
such an action was in direct violation of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), regardless 137
of
the fact that the state paid for the mental patients' current maintenance.
The court did not decide whether a state could lawfully use Social
Security benefits to pay for current maintenance when acting as
representative payee.
In Crawford, the state of California also tried to reach mental patient
benefits. 139 California distinguished itself from the situation in Brinkman
by seeking patient permission to reach benefits. 4 However, where a
patient refused to give permission the state still attached the benefits.' 4 '
The California statute made no mention of the seizure, garnishment, and
attachment procedures outlawed by 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), in contrast to the

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263,264 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 265.
137. ld. at 266.
138. Id.
139. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1995).
140. Id. at 1165-66. The state asked the patients to sign a contract transferring their benefits to the
state for their costs of care. Id.
141. Id. at 1166.
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Washington statute, but the state did still employ those procedures.142
This distinction did not persuade the Ninth Circuit, which held that
California's request that patients sign a form with no practical import,
combined with an absence of language in the state's statute authorizing
specifically outlawed procedures, lacked significance and held the
practice violated § 407(a). 43
2.

FederalRegulations PermitRepresentative Payees, Including
States, to Use Benefits to Reimburse CurrentMaintenance Costs

Although state institutions may not claim Social Security benefits
when acting as creditors, they may reimburse themselves for care
provided when acting as representative payee pursuant to Social Security
regulations.'" Unlike creditors, representative payees must act in the best
interests of the beneficiaries, as overseen by SSA. While creditors have
consistently tried and failed to reach benefits, a state's ability to act as
representative payee and
receive reimbursement for its services has gone
45
virtually unchallenged.
Only three cases have dealt with challenges to a state's ability to serve
as representative payee. In C.G.A. v. State,146 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a state may act as representative payee, 47 even over the protests
of the child beneficiary and that beneficiary's existing representative
payee. 4 8 The state placed this child beneficiary, C.G.A., in state care

142. Id. The Washington statute specifically permitted attachment, garnishment, and seizure of
benefits, though without reference to § 407(a). Id.
143. See Crawford,56 F.3d at 1166.
144. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 (2001) ("If a beneficiary is receiving care in a Federal, State,
or private institution because of mental or physical incapacity, current maintenance includes the
customary charges made by the institution, as well as expenditures for those items which will aid in
the beneficiary's recovery or release from the institution or expenses for personal needs which will
improve the beneficiary's conditions while in the institution.")
145. Only three cases, Keffeler v. Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 145 Wash. 2d 1, 32 P.3d 267
(2001), King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1991), and C.G.A. v. State, 824 P.2d 1364 (Ak.
1992), have confronted this issue. Keffeler is the only case to hold that a state may not reimburse
itself in the manner permitted by Social Security regulations. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 4, 32 P.3d at
268.
146. 824 P.2d 1364.
147. Id. at 1366.
148. Id. at 1365.
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after he was arrested for committing various minor crimes.'4 9 SSA
appointed the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) as
representative payee in place of the child's mother, Ida Jousma, 150 who
voluntarily relinquished her payee status.'15 Both Jousma and C.G.A.
challenged the state's use of C.G.A.'s benefits, arguing that by
reimbursing itself for C.G.A.'s care, the state violated the provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 407.152 The court referred to the pertinent Social Security
regulations,15 3 and found that "statutory authority exists for the state to be
designated C.G.A.'s representative payee, and that, as payee, the state
154 The
can devote C.G.A.'s benefit funds to authorized expenditures."
Alaska Supreme Court went on to specifically authorize the use of
benefits for foster care. 55 The court also noted that the Social Security
Act clearly contemplated states as representative payees and did not
prohibit states from reimbursing themselves from Social Security
benefits.'56
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also found that states could
become representative payees in King v. Schafer. 7 Here the court was
faced with a state mental institution using benefits to reimburse itself for
two classes of patients: patients for whom the state acted as
representative payee and patients for whom the state did not.'58 All of the
patients brought suit to stop the state from using their Social Security
benefits to pay for their current maintenance costs. 59 The court did stop
the state's practice of using benefits to pay for the current maintenance of
the mental patients for whom the state was not representative payee

149. Id.
150. Id. at 1366.
151. id. at 1365. The lower court also found that Jousma had not used C.G.A.'s benefits for his
current maintenance, as required under federal regulations. Id. at 1366.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
153. The court specifically referred to 20 C.F.R. § 404.2021(b)(7) (1990).
154. C.G.A., 824 P.2d at 1368.
155. Id. at 1368-69.
156. Id. at 1369. The court did not decide whether juvenile incarceration was the kind of
institutional care the Social Security Act permitted, and instead left that question to SSA pursuant to
the agency's primary jurisdiction over such matters. Id. at 1369-70.
157. 940 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1991).
158. Id. at 1183.
159. Id. at 1184.
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because this violated 42 U.S.C. § 407.160 However, the Eighth Circuit
permitted the state to use the funds
of those patients for whom the state
161
did act as representative payee.
The five patients in King acknowledged that as to them, the federal
regulations were clear and did allow the state to use their benefits to pay
for their current maintenance costs. 162 The patients argued that the state's
application to act as a representative payee violated the "other legal
process" provision of § 407(a)." The court found no merit in this claim
given the clarity of the regulations!" The Eighth Circuit also pointed out
that for many of the patients the state was the only entity able to serve as
representative
payee and there was no logic in preventing them from
65
doing so.'
Both C.G.A. and King stand for the proposition that a state may
become a representative payee.166 As illustrated in these cases, the only
two courts to consider the question prior to Keffeler agreed that the
Social Security Act allows states to act as representative payee, and use
benefits for current maintenance. 67 The fact that SSA appointed state
agencies as representative payees in these cases shows that the agency
itself had reached the same conclusion.
III. FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY DECISIONS
DEMAND DEFERENCE FROM STATE COURTS
Courts generally defer to agency interpretations of federal statutes,
particularly where an agency is in charge of carrying out many of a
statute's mandates. 68 The United States Supreme Court has addressed
this issue, notably in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense

160. Id. at 1186.
161. Id.
162. id.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1994). As explained above, the "other legal process" provision is a
sweeping provision meant to prevent creditors from using creative ways to illegally reach benefits.
See also Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973).
164. 940 F.2d at 1185.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1185-86; C.G.A., 824 P.2d at 1365.
167. King, 940 F.2d at 1185-86; C.G.A, 824 P.2d at 1365.
168. See infra note 170.
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Council,169 and Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan v. de la Cuesta.'70 In
each case, the Court emphasized the deference courts owe agency
decisions. 7 '
In de la Cuesta, the Court decided a conflict regarding the effect of a
federal agency decision on state law.'7 2 Specifically, the Court overruled
a California Court of Appeals judgment which contradicted the
discretionary decision of the administrator of the Federal Loan Bank
Board (Board)."n The Court examined whether the Board and its
administrator acted within the scope of their delegated authority. 174 The
Board's administrator had included a due-on-sale clause 171 to the Board's
loans, at a time when such clauses were held by California state courts to
be unlawful restraints on alienation. 176 In examining whether the Board's
decision would control, the Court wrote that "[wihere Congress has
directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are
subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his
statutory authority or acted arbitrarily."'" In de la Cuesta, the Board
and administrator had acted within their statutory authority. 178 Therefore
court's ruling, pursuant to the
the Board's decision controlled the state
179
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
The Court again addressed this issue in Chevron, creating a two-step
analysis with which courts could determine whether they could review a
federal agency decision. 80 First, a court must determine "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."'' If
Congress has, then the matter ends there, and no further inquiry is
169. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
170. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
171. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 840-43; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 144-46.
172. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 144.
173. Id. at 170.
174. Id. at 154.
175. A due-on-sale clause is a contractual provision that permits the lender to declare the entire
balance of a loan immediately due and payable if the property securing the loan is sold or otherwise
transferred. Id. at 145.
176. Id. at 149.
177. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Id. at842.
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permissible.' However, where a court finds ambiguity in the statute as
to whether Congress has directly spoken to a certain issue, a court may
then determine whether the regulation is acceptable. 183 Ambiguity exists
where a statute allows for more than one reasonable interpretation. 184
Where such ambiguity exists, the court must look at the statute in its
entirety and read the particular provision in context.' 85 If still ambiguous,
the court must defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute, if it is
"based on a permissible construction of the statute." '86 Then the court
may only overrule the agency's interpretation 187where it is "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. ,
IV. THE KEFFELERCOURT HELD THAT DSHS COULD NOT
USE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS TO PAY FOR THE
CURRENT MAINTENANCE OF FOSTER CHILDREN
The controversy at issue in Keffeler v. Department of Social and
Health Services'8 8 arose when DSHS tried to gain representative payee
status for Daniel Keffeler.189 At the time the of the state's attempt to
become representative payee, Keffeler was in Washington's foster care
program and his grandmother was his representative payee. 19 The state
failed to gain representative payee status and Keffeler sued the state' 9' on
behalf of all foster children, past, present and future, within the state of
Washington. 192 Keffeler claimed that DSHS acted as a creditor in
violation of § 407, the anti-attachment provision of the Social Security

182. Id. at 842-43.
183. Id. at 843.
184. DeGeorge v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 219 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215,221 (1991).
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
187. Id. at 844.
188. 145 Wash. 2d 1, 32 P.3d 267 (2001).
189. Id. at 13-14, 32 P.3d at 273.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Act,'93 and demanded that DSHS return all Social Security benefits
which it had ever collected as representative payee.'94
1.

The Keffeler Court Held that DSHS Failedto Act in the Best
Interests of FosterChildren in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)

Although Keffeler did not raise the issue, the Supreme Court of
Washington considered sua sponte whether DSHS acted in the best
interests of foster children, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405(j).' 95 The
court found that DSHS did not act in the best interests of the foster
children for whom it acted as representative payee. 196 Because
Washington State law already required DSHS to provide for foster
children, the court held that the DSHS would better serve the children if
it did not use their Social Security benefits for current maintenance. 97
The court instead stated that benefits should be saved for the nonessential needs not necessarily provided for by DSHS.' 98 Because the
children would be better served by the state conserving the funds in this
manner, the court reasoned that DSHS did not act in the foster children's
best interests.' 99
2.

The Keffeler Court Held That The Thrust of Case Law Elevates
Social Security Benefits Beyond the Reach of States

The Supreme Court of Washington also agreed with Keffeler's claim
that DSHS actions as representative payee violated 42 U.S.C. § 407."
The court pointed to Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board,2° ' Bennett
v. Arkansas,"2 Brinkman v. Rahm,0 3 and Crawfordv. Gould2°4 in support
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 23-24,32 P.3d at 278.
196. id.
197. Id. at 20, 32 P.3d at 276.
198. Id.
199. ld.
200. Id. at 23-24, 32 P.3d at 278.
201. 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
202. 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
203. 878 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1989).
204. 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995).
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of its decision."' Although each of these cases dealt specifically with
creditors who did not have representative payee status, the court ignored
this distinction and reasoned that together they suggested that Social
Security benefits are "for all intents and purposes, beyond the reach of
the state." 6 According to the court, Philpott imposed "a broad bar
against the use of any legal process to reach all Social Security
benefits ....broad enough to include all claimants, including a State."2 7
The court found that in Keffeler, DSHS acted like the Essex County
Welfare Board in Philpott.20 8 The Supreme Court of Washington
reasoned that the state should not receive any preferred status because of
its duty to care for the needy, and thus § 407 barred the state from using
Social Security funds just as all other creditors. 2 9 The fact that SSA
appointed DSHS representative payee for each of the foster children for
whom it collected benefits failed convince the court that Social Security
regulations actually permitted them to do so.2" 0 The court explained that
in its view, DSHS applied to act as payee in order to apply benefits
toward maintenance costs; DSHS sought payee status only to "confiscate
the child's SSI money to benefit the state."
3.

The Supreme Court of Washington Held that the State may be
Appointed Representative Payee, But Cannot Use Benefits to Pay
for the CurrentMaintenance of FosterChildren

DSHS pointed to two cases in support of its argument in which courts
permitted states to act as representative payees, King v. Schafe 21 2 and
C.G.A. v. State.21 3 However, the Supreme Court of Washington was not
persuaded by these cases. 214 The court reasoned that King was not on
point because it stood only for the proposition that states may apply to

205. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 18, 32 P.3d at 275.
206. Id. at 20, 32 P.3d at 276.
207. Id. at 18, 32 P.3d at 275, (quoting Philpon,409 U.S. at 417).
208. Id. at 22, 32 P.3d at 277.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 16, 32 P.3d at 274.
211. Id.
212. 940 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1991).
213. 824 P.2d 1364 (Ak. 1992).
214. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 21-23, 32 P.3d at 277.
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act as representative payee." 5 According to the court, the only issue in
King was whether a state applying to act as representative payee
amounted to a creditor's attempt to use an "other legal process" to reach
benefits, and thus violated § 407(a).2 16 The parties in King accepted that
federal regulations clearly allowed representative payees, including
states, to use benefits for current maintenance. 1 7 The Supreme Court of
Washington explained that because this notion was accepted by both
parties, the court did not have to rule on its validity and thus the court did
not actually hold as much to be true. 21 To the contrary, the court found
the only persuasive aspect of King to21be
the notion that a state could
9
apply to become a representative payee.
The fact that the Alaska Supreme Court explicitly asserted that a state
could become a representative payee for foster children and apply a
foster child's Social Security benefits toward that child's current
maintenance costs did not convince the Supreme Court of Washington to
hold the same.m The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that
C.G.A., like King, stood merely for the proposition that a state could
apply to become and be appointed representative payee, not that a state
could use Social Security benefits to pay for the current maintenance of
beneficiaries."2 The Supreme Court of Washington did not address the
222
Alaska Supreme Court's direct statement to the contrary.
The Supreme Court of Washington saw no conflict between its
decision in Keffeler and the decisions in C.G.A. and King because in its
view there was "nothing ipso facto wrong with DSHS applying to
become the representative payee for certain foster children, as § 405(j)
and the SSA's accompanying regulations explicitly contemplate."'2' The
problem, according to the court, was the fact that the state reimbursed
itself for a foster child's current maintenance, therefore crossing the line

215. Id.
216. id.
217. King, 940 F.2d at 1185.
218. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 21-23, 32 P.3d at 277.
219. Id.
220. Id.; see also C.G.A. v. State, 824 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Ak. 1992).
221. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 21-23, 32 P.3d at 277.
222. See Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 13-14,32 P.3d at 273.
223. Id. at 21-22, 32 P.3d at 277.
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established by § 407(a) and the creditor cases detailed above. 224 Because
DSHS would only be reimbursed for its foster care services by Social
Security if it acted as representative payee and because it acted as
representative payee in order to receive such reimbursement, the court
reasoned DSHS acted as a creditor. 2' According to the Supreme Court of
Washington, DSHS's capacity to act as representative payee under
§ 405(j) was "at best immaterial" to its § 407 analysis. 6
4.

The Keffeler DissentArgued that SSA AppropriatelyAppointed
DSHS RepresentativePayee, and Therefore DSHS Should be
Allowed to Act as a RepresentativePayee

The dissent disagreed with the majority's opinion that DSHS could
not use Social Security benefits to pay for the current maintenance of
foster children. 7 Writing for the three-member dissent, Justice Bridge
noted that federal law permits agencies like DSHS to become
representative payee and permits representative payees to use such funds
for the current maintenance of beneficiaries. 2's The dissent reasoned,
DSHS should-once appointed representative payee-be able to use
22 9
Social Security benefits for the current maintenance of beneficiaries.
The dissent pointed out that the Social Security Act itself allows
creditors to be appointed representative payee."0 Although the dissent
did not mention de la Cuesta or the Chevron doctrine, Justice Bridge did
note that it was the Commissioner who had the discretion to appoint a
representative payee.23 She also wrote that "even if DSHS is
characterized as a creditor, the commissioner of Social Security may
find, and here has found, DSHS acceptable to serve as a representative
payee for these children in foster care. The determination of the Social
Security Act should control. '' 2 The dissent also discussed the case law

224. Id.
225. Id. at 17, 32 P.3d at 274-75.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 27, 32 P.3d at 279 (Bridge, J., dissenting.).
228. Id. at 27, 32 P.3d at 279-80.
229. Id. at 27, 32 P.3d at 280.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 28, 32 P.3d at 280.
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cited by the majority and suggested it applied to creditors, but where
SSA appointed a creditor as representative payee, that appointment
should control z3"
V.

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
MISINTERPRETED THE LEGAL AUTHORITY RELEVANT
TO KEFFELER AND FAILED TO DEFER TO SSA'S
DETERMINATION THAT DSHS COULD ACT AS
REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE

The Supreme Court of Washington erred by holding that a state,
acting as a representative payee, could not use Social Security benefits
for a beneficiary's current maintenance. The cases the Keffeler court
relied on stand only for the proposition that states may not violate
§ 407(a) of the Social Security Act. The court misinterpreted these cases
by finding that they prohibited states from reaching benefits altogether.
Federal law and regulations explicitly permit state agencies to act as
representative payees. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Washington
failed to adequately distinguish other case law which indicates that states
may act as representative payees and that they may reimburse themselves
for the current maintenance costs of the beneficiaries on whose behalf
they act. The Keffeler court also should have applied the Chevron
doctrine and shown appropriate deference to the SSA's decision to
appoint DSHS representative payee for the beneficiaries in this case. For
these reasons, the Supreme Court of Washington erred when it held that
DSHS could not use a beneficiary's Social Security benefits to pay for
his or her current maintenance, and its error cost foster children in
Washington their Social Security benefits.
A.

The Cases Used as Supportfor the Supreme Court of Washington's
Decision Stand Only for the Propositionthat a State May Not
Violate § 407(a) of the Social Security Act

The Supreme Court of Washington misinterpreted Philpott,"4
Bennett,s Brinkman, 6 and Crawford. 7 In construing these decisions,
233. Id.
234. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
235. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
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the court claimed that the "thrust of the case law is that Social Security
benefits are, for all intents and purposes, beyond the reach of the
state. '' "BYet, each of these cases stands solely for the proposition that
state agencies may not violate § 407(a) of the Social Security Act. 39 At
most, these cases suggest that Social Security benefits are, for almost all
intents and purposes, beyond the reach of creditors. 240 For example, in
Philpott, the Court refused to allow a creditor to reach Social Security
benefits.241 The Court made clear that this was the case even where the
creditor was a state.242 This is all that the Court held or implied: a broad
bar exists against creditors reaching Social Security benefits, a bar which
applies even to states. 43 To reconstruct this holding to suggest that there
is a broad bar against states reaching Social Security benefits in all
circumstances is a broad leap of logic. 2' This expansion of the holding in
Philpott is particularly striking when contrasted with the court's
exceptional narrowing of the holdings in C. G.A. and King.2 45
The Keffeler court's explanation of Bennett is equally flawed. In
Bennett the Court again held that a creditor could not reach Social
Security benefits, 46 even where the creditor provided for all of the
maintenance of the beneficiary.24 7 The Keffeler court claimed that DSHS
tried to "evade § 407(a) by arguing that it simply provides the 'care and
maintenance' intended by the SSA." 248 The court found DSHS's
factual
some
"notwithstanding
argument
unconvincing,
dissimilarities."2 49 Yet the "factual dissimilarities" s0 that the Supreme
Court of Washington used to distinguish Bennett and Keffeler are glaring
236. Brinkman v. Rahm, 878 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1989).
237. Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995).
238. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 20, 32 P.3d at 276.
239. See supra Part II.B.1.
240. See supra Part II.B.1.
241. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 416 (1973).
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
See id. (emphasis added).
See supranote 238.
See supra Part III.B.

246. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 398 (1988).
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248. Keffeler v. Dept. of Soc. and Health Servs., 145 Wash. 2d 1, 19, 32 P.3d 267,276 (2001).
249. Id.
250. Id.
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and should not have been dismissed so lightly. The primary
"dissimilarity" is that the defendant in Bennett was a creditor with no
obligations regarding the beneficiary or the beneficiary's Social Security
funds whatsoever."' In Keffeler, the defendant was a representative
payee'5 required by federal law to use the beneficiary's Social Security
benefits for the beneficiary's best interests.5 Representative payees have
numerous responsibilities, and their misuse of benefits constitutes a
felony. 4 Bennett re-enforces the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
Philpott that creditors may not reach Social Security benefits. 5 Nothing
in Bennett suggests that because a creditor may not reach Social Security
benefits, a representative payee is likewise unable to reach Social
Security benefits to pay for a beneficiary's current maintenance."
Similarly, Brinkman and Crawford also stand only for the proposition
that a state may not violate § 407(a), and nothing more.
DSHS fully complied with the rules established by Philpott, Bennett,
Brinkman and Crawford.58 These cases made clear that a state that is not
a representative payee may not attach, seize, levy, garnish, or use other
legal processes to reach Social Security benefits.n 9 Additionally, states
may not excuse § 407(a) violations by using funds illegally seized to pay
for a beneficiary's current maintenance.2 6' The fact that the state agencies
in Philpott, Bennett, Brinkman and Crawford owed and fulfilled other
statutory obligations, such as providing welfare or mental health
services, had no bearing on the legality of their claim to the Social
Security benefits. 261 Likewise, had DSHS fulfilled its foster care duties,
but not acted as representative payee, it could not have reached Social
Security benefits. 262 Yet, unlike the state agencies in these cases, DSHS
251. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 398.
252. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 16, 32 P.3d at 274.
253. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035 (2001).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 408 (1994).
255. Bennett, 485 U.S. at 398.
256. Bennett discusses only creditors access to benefits and does not discuss representative
payees. See Id. at. 395.
257. See supraPart II.B.1.
258. See supraPart H.B.1.
259. See supraPart II.B.1.
260. See supraPart ll.B.1.
261. See supraPart II.B.1.
262. See, e.g,. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
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did not attach, seize, levy, garnish, or use any other legal process to
illegally reach any Social Security benefits. 263 To the contrary, DSHS
applied to the Social Security Administration to act as representative
payee for certain foster children.2 64 In so doing, DSHS created a legal
obligation between itself, the beneficiary, and the Social Security
Administration to use Social Security benefits for the best interests of the
beneficiary, 65 an obligation completely lacking in Philpott, Bennett,
Brinkman and Crawford.
While DSHS also used benefits to pay for the current maintenance of
beneficiaries, 66 it is easily distinguishable from Philpott, Bennett,
Brinkman and Crawford. Simply put, SSA recognizes that use of benefits
for current maintenance by a representativepayee is in the best interests
of the beneficiary.267 DSHS had a legal obligation to use Social Security
benefits in the beneficiaries' best interests. 2 ' This duty differentiates
DSHS from the state agencies in the § 407(a) cases, which had no such
duty to use the benefits in the beneficiary's best interests because they
were not representative payees.
B.

The Supreme Court of Washington Failedto Adequately
Distinguish Cases that Permit States to Act as Representative
Payee

Both King v. Schafer and C.G.A. v. State stand for the proposition that
a state may become a representative payee. Once appointed
representative payee, a state may act as representative payee. 26 9 This rule
is strikingly simple, especially in contrast to the Keffeler court's attempt
to suggest that a state may apply to become and even become a
representative payee, but not act as a representative payee.
The Keffeler court attempted to distinguish King and C.G.A. by
suggesting they stood merely for the proposition that a state could apply
to become, and even be appointed representative payee, but that a state
263. Keffeler v. Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 145 Wash. 2d 1, 15,32 P.3d 267,274 (2001).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 24, 32 P.3d at 278.
266. Id. at 11, 32 P.3d at 272.
267. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added).
268. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.031 (2001).
269. See supranote 143.
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could not use Social Security benefits for a beneficiary's current
maintenance.27 However, there is nothing in either case, or in any other
case, statute or regulation, to suggest such a limitation. 27 1
The Keffeler court's limitation of the King and C.G.A. holdings
contradicts the thrust of those decisions and the provisions of the Social
Security Act. King and C.G.A. each involved beneficiaries battling to
keep Social Security benefits out of the hands of state representative
payees.272 In each case, the beneficiary challenged the state's legal right
to become representative payee.'
The beneficiaries in both cases
accepted that representative payees may use benefits for what they
determine are in the beneficiary's best interests, including current
maintenance. 274 The Keffeler court reasoned that because each set of
plaintiffs accepted this as obvious, the courts never actually reached the
issue. 275 The Keffeler court thus determined that King and C.G.A. only
stood for the proposition that states could apply to become and be
appointed representative payee, not that they could use benefits as other
representative payees could.276
Yet the courts in each of these cases clearly envisioned the states
taking and using the benefits in question to pay for the maintenance of
the beneficiaries. 2' For example, the Alaska Supreme Court in C.G.A.
explicitly authorized use of Social Security benefits for foster care,
stating a representative payee's "authority to spend these [Social
Security] funds is limited to spending on maintenance that does not
conflict with Social Security laws and regulations. Thus, the state could
legitimately apply C.G.A.'s benefits toward foster care." 278 In King, the
beneficiaries claimed that a state application to become representative
payee violated § 407(a) of the Social Security Act.279 The Ninth Circuit

270. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 21-22,32 P.3d at 277.
271. See supra Part ll.B.
272. King v. Schafer, 940 F.2d 1182, 1183 (8th Cir. 1991), and C.G.A. v. State, 824 P.2d 1364,
1365 (Ak. 1992).
273. King, 940 F.2d at 1183; C.G.A., 824 P.2d at 1365.
274. King, 940 F.2d at 1185.
275. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 21, 32 P.3d at 277.
276. See id.
277. See King, 940 F.2d at 1185-86.
278. C.G.A., 824 P.2d at 1369 n.14.
279. King, 940F.2d at 1185.
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court rejected this contention because the Act clearly allowed states to
become representative payees.2 The fact that the courts in King and
C.G.A. did not specifically hold that state representative payees may use
benefits to pay for a beneficiary's current maintenance does not indicate
that the issue was unresolved, as the Keffeler court suggests.28 ' Rather, to
the contrary, this simply indicates that as to King, a state acting as
representative payee was so clear and obvious an extension of its holding
that it was not necessary to state explicitly. 2 C.G.A. did state explicitly
that a state could use benefits in this manner. 83
The simpler and more logical reading of the King and C.G.A.
decisions accepts that the courts understood and intended that their
rulings would permit state representative payees to apply funds toward
current maintenance. This is due to the plain implications of their
decisions, and because the Social Security Act permits states to become
representative payees.2" To suggest that a state may become a payee but
not use funds for current maintenance implies that state representative
payees have a different set of obligations from other representative
payees-a concept completely unsupported by the statute or case law.2" 5
Representative payees may reimburse themselves for current
maintenance.286 Payees may do this even where required to provide for
the current maintenance of the beneficiary, regardless of Social Security
benefits. This is most clearly illustrated in Mellies v. Mellies2 7 and In re
Guardianshipof Nelson,288 which both stand for the proposition that a
parent who is legally required to care for a child may nevertheless use
Social Security benefits for that child's basic needs. 9 In Mellies, the
child beneficiary argued that because his father was required to pay for
his basic needs, that his Social Security benefits should not be spent on

280. Id.
281. See Keffeler v. Dep't Soc. and Health Servs., 145 Wash. 2d 1, 21,32 P.3d 267,277 (2001).
282. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1994) which explicitly envisions state agencies acting as
representative payee.
283. See C.G.A., 824 P.2d at 1368. (emphasis added).
284. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(a)(1) (2001).
285. See supra Part II.A.1.
286.
287.
288.
289.
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those same needs because such a use would not be in his best interests.290
The beneficiary argued he would be better off with his father paying out
of his pocket for basic care and having the Social Security funds invested
or saved in some other manner.2 91 This is analogous to the court's
reasoning in Keffeler, as the state was already required to provide foster
care, it would not be in the beneficiary's best interests to use Social
Security benefits to pay for current maintenance, but to conserve those
funds.292 The Mellies court found this argument unconvincing, and held
that the representative payee had no obligation to first expend its own
funds before using a beneficiary's Social Security benefits to pay for that
beneficiary's current maintenance.293 The Nelson court reached
essentially the same conclusion. 294 The Supreme Court of Washington in
Keffeler did not cite to the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Mellies
or to Minnesota's ruling in Nelson, holding the same conduct approved
of by the Kansas court to be a violation of § 407(a).295 The Keffeler court
held that it was in the beneficiary's best interest to have Social Security
benefits conserved and not spent on the beneficiary's current
maintenance where that maintenance was already required by law.296
The Keffeler court did not go so far as to suggest that parents acting as
representative payees could not use benefits for current maintenance,
although this is the only logical extension of the court's decision. 297 Yet
such an extension would vastly alter the laws controlling representative
payees, which explicitly state that a payee spending benefits on current
maintenance is considered to act in the best interest of the beneficiary.2 9
To apply the Keffeler holding only to states acting as representative
payee would create two separate sets of rules for representative payees,
one set for states and another for other representative payees. There are
no separate rules for state representative payees as opposed to non-state

290. Mellies, 815 P.2d at 116; Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 109.
291. Mellies, 815 P.2d at 116; Nelson, 547 N.W.2d at 109.
292. See Keffeler v. Dep't. Soc. and Health Servs., 145 Wash. 2d 1, 17-18, 32 P.3d 267, 275
(2001).
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representative payees, despite the Keffeler court's implication to that
end.299
Limiting King and C.G.A. in the manner suggested by Keffeler would
effectively make an application to act representative payee by a state
pointless and risky. Representative payee status for a state agency would
be pointless if the state was unable to use the funds in a way it
determined to be in the beneficiary's best interests. Gaining
representative payee status would also carry great risk because the rules
governing payees might or might not apply, making it exceptionally
difficult for the state to know which rules to follow in order to avoid
potential liability.
C.

The Supreme Court of Washington Failedto Give Proper
Deference to the Social Security Administration's Own
Interpretationsand Decisions in Keffeler

The Supreme Court of Washington should have, at the very least, read
Keffeler in light of the Chevron doctrine and the United States Supreme
Court's decision in de la Cuesta. Indeed, the only place in which Keffeler
made a nod to the authority of SSA was in the dissent, where the
dissenting justices noted that "even if DSHS is characterized as a
creditor, the commissioner of Social Security may find, and here has
found, DSHS acceptable to serve as a representative payee for these
children in foster care."3 ' If the Supreme Court of Washington had
examined the issues before it in light of Chevron and de la Cuesta, it
30
would have reached the correct result. '
The Chevron doctrine requires that courts apply a two-step analysis
when deciding whether to review agency decisions. 0 2 Thus, the court
would have had to ask whether Congress had already spoken to this issue
raised in Keffeler, namely whether a state may use Social Security
payments for the current maintenance of a person for whom that state

299. See supra Part II.B.2.
300. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 28, 32 P.3d at 280 (emphasis in original).
301. See supranote 179.
302. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). First, a
court must determine whether Congress has already spoken directly to the exact question at issue. If
Congress has then the matter ends and no further inquiry is permitted. See also supraPartIII.
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acted as representative payee. 3 The answer to this question is clearly
yes,304 a state may use benefits to pay for the current maintenance of a
beneficiary when acting as representative payee, even to the extent that it
reimburses itself for services which it is required to provide. 0 5 This rule
is found in 42 U.S.C. § 405(j), which permits states to act as
representative payees, and allows representative payees to apply benefits
toward the current maintenance of beneficiaries." 6 By way of example it
is also helpful to note that 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040 specifically allows state
institutions to use benefits to pay for a beneficiary's institutional care. 7
This is significant especially in light of King, which allowed a state
mental institution, when acting as representative payee, to use
beneficiaries' Social Security benefits to pay for their care at the
institution. 0 ' The statute and federal regulations unambiguously permit
states to act as representative payees and to apply benefits to the
beneficiary's current maintenance. 9
Even if the Supreme Court of Washington had found that Congress
had not directly spoken to this question, under the second prong of the
Chevron doctrine the court should have found SSA's decision
The U.S. Supreme Court
permissible and therefore controlling."
emphasized the importance of deferring to permissible1 agency
interpretations.3 2 Agency regulations are unacceptable only where they
are "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute. 3 3 The
regulations permit the state to reimburse itself for maintenance, and the
Supreme Court of Washington failed to show how the agency's own

303. See supraPartHI.
304. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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determination that the state could serve as representative payee and use
Social Security benefits for maintenance was "arbitrary, capricious or
manifestly contrary to the statute. 314
The preemption issues discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in de 3la15
Cuesta also permitted DSHS to use benefits for costs of current care.
The facts of de la Cuesta are particularly relevant given similarities to
the issues in Keffeler.316 The Court in de la Cuesta held that "[w]here
Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his
judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he
has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily.' 317 In Keffler,
as in de la Cuesta, there was an administrator directed by Congress to
exercise discretion in managing a federal program. 318 Both the majority
and the dissent in Keffeler acknowledged that SSA had appointed DSHS
to act as representative payee.319 In such circumstances the U.S. Supreme
Court has made clear that the administrator's judgments are subject to
review by the courts only to determine if the administrator has acted
beyond the scope of his statutory authority or has acted arbitrarily. 3 °
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Washington provided no evidence of
abuse of discretion and yet did not defer. This is particularly conspicuous
in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's past decisions emphasizing the need
to provide even greater deference to an agency's own interpretations of
the law in complex fields like Social Security.3 1
To the extent that DSHS could be considered a creditor in Keffeler,
the dissent correctly pointed out that the court owed deference to the
Commissioner's decision to appoint DSHS representative payee. 22 Even
if DSHS is considered a creditor, SSA still has the discretion to appoint
DSHS representative payee if it determines that that appointment is in
314. Id.
315. See supraPart III.
316. See supraPart II.
317. Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (emphasis
added).
318. See supranote 145.
319. Keffeler v. Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs., 145 Wash. 2d 1, 19, 27-28, 32 P.3d 267, 276,
280(2001).
320. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54.
321. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,40 (1981) (holding there is a special need to defer
to the Commissioner's interpretation of the Social Security Act).
322. Keffeler, 145 Wash. 2d at 27-28, 32 P.3d at 280.
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the child's best interests.3 The courts must provide deference to agency
decisions like this, pursuant to both Chevron and de la Cuesta. 24 Here,
had the Keffeler court given SSA's determinations the deference they
were due, Social Security benefits in Washington could still be spent on
current maintenance costs for foster children today.
VI. CONCLUSION
SSA appointed DSHS to act as representative payee, and it carried out
its duties responsibly and within the guidelines established by federal
laws and regulations. DSHS is not a creditor in this situation, but even if
it were, it could still act as representative payee with an appointment
from the Commissioner of SSA. The Washington State Supreme Court
should have applied the statute and regulations as interpreted by SSA.
Furthermore, by expanding Philpott,Bennett, and Brinkman to apply to
the strikingly different circumstances in Keffeler, the court overstepped
the bounds of logic and forced two parts of the Social Security Act into
irreconcilable conflict. The Supreme Court of Washington should not
have on the one hand read those opinions so broadly and on the other
hand spliced the opinions of C.G.A. and King so minutely in order to
reach false harmony between them. Instead, the court should have
deferred to SSA decisions and followed the rules established by the only
other courts to address similar facts.
Unless the United States Supreme Court reverses the Keffeler court's
decision, many children will continue to go without the Social Security
benefits to which they are entitled. The Supreme Court of Washington
failed to do these children justice because it did not provide due
deference to the Social Security Administration or existing case law. Had
the court done so, DSHS could still use these benefits to care for
children.
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